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ABSTRACT 
 
This study presents a model of firm performance for Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE) Entry-Growth–
Exit strategies categorized by focus of entrepreneurship, CE domain, and CE form.  Over a longitudinal 
sample, this paper examines U.S. computer firm’s CE strategies and firm performance during two 
technological disruptions namely the introduction of personal computers and subsequently the internet.  
This paper shows that computer companies had superior performance by implementing CE strategies of 
sustained regeneration and organizational rejuvenation during growth.  In addition, best performing 
companies survived the internet technological disruption by implementing the CE strategy of domain 
redefinition. This study concludes with recommendations for future research. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
hat is the impact of corporate entrepreneurship on firm performance during technological disruptions? 
Both scholars and practitioners are interested in understanding corporate entrepreneurship (Chandler & 
Lyon, 2001; Dess, Ireland, Zahra, Floyd, Janney, & Lane, 2003; Gregoire, Noel, Dery, & Bechard, 
2006). Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is the process whereby a firm creates a new organization or 
instigates renewal or innovation within an existing organization (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999).  Corporate Entrepreneurship 
has long been identified as a key means for promoting and sustaining competitive advantage (Covin & Miles, 1999).  CE is 
a means of accumulating, converting, and leveraging resources for competitive purpose (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1999) to 
rejuvenate and redefine the firm and its markets (Covin & Miles, 1999).  CE is also a means to venture into new markets by 
creating new organizations from within the firm, or acquiring them, or engaging in complex alliances for the purpose of 
market entry (Miles & Covin, 2002).  
 j
 
Although significant theorizing has been proposed to clarify the domain of CE , there is nevertheless a need to 
examine what is the relationship between different CE forms and firm performance (Dess, Ireland, Zahra, Floyd, Janney, & 
Lane, 2003).  An area that has not received much attention in CE research is the effectiveness of CE under technological 
disruptions.  There is substantial research on CE under dynamic markets (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2004) in particular in the 
computer industry (Christensen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  However, the understanding of what type of CE, if 
any, might yield superior performance under technological disruption is limited. A technological disruption (Christensen, 
1997) is a period of rapid industry transformation characterized by the introduction and adoption of new technologies 
resulting in the rise of new entrants and the obsolescence of incumbents (Danneels, 2004).  Hence, this study contributes to 
the understanding of the impact of CE on firm performance during technological disruptions. 
 
The main goal of this study is to propose a model of CE and firm performance under technological disruption. A 
specific objective of this study is to examine and test what types of CE yield superior performance during entry, growth and 
exit on an industry under technological disruption such as the computer industry.  
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This study begins by briefly reviewing the CE literature and proposing the model of CE and firm performance 
under technological disruption.  It follows a brief description of the successive technological disruptions of the computer 
industry from 1976 to 2007.  Then it proceeds with an application of cross-section time-series regression analysis with 
pooled data. Tests were designed to assess the impact of CE on firm performance during entry, growth, and exit on the 
computer industry.  It concludes with a discussion of results. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Danneels (2004) defined disruptive technologies as “those technologies that render established technologies 
obsolete and therefore destroy the value of the investments that incumbents have made in those technologies,” (p.248). 
Christensen (1997) claims that overshooting is the main self-defeating mechanism of incumbents during technological 
disruption.  On the face of disruptive technologies, incumbents tend to overshoot, that is, they offer improved versions of 
their products to the point where their new features are beyond the quality expectations of customers.  On the other hand, 
new entrants will offer products often below customer quality expectations but with features that satisfy customer needs 
better than old products.  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Corporate Entrepreneurship and Firm Performance during Technological Disruptions 
 
Focus of 
Entrepreneurship 
CE domain Entry  Growth Exit 
Internal 
Corporate 
Rejuvenation 
Innovators dilemma: 
Incumbents 
overshooting yields 
diminishing 
performance 
Corporate rejuvenation 
yields higher 
performance gains  
Innovators dilemma: 
Best performers have a 
chance of surviving 
using Domain 
redefinition. Other CE 
forms lead to 
overshooting and 
diminishing 
performance 
 Corporate Venturing Innovators dilemma: 
Tech Disruption favors 
performance gains 
through Internal 
venturing of New 
entrants 
Uncertainty of Tech 
disruption is resolved 
and internal venturing 
yields diminishing 
performance  
Innovators dilemma: 
Internal venturing 
leading to domain 
redefinition could 
yield performance 
gains 
External 
Corporate 
Rejuvenation 
Innovators dilemma: 
Incumbents emphasize 
internal improvement 
over domain 
redefinition, however, 
yielding diminishing 
performance 
Uncertainty of Tech 
disruption is resolved 
and strategic 
positioning yield 
increasing 
performance gains 
Innovators dilemma: 
Incumbents exit 
seeking to sell venture 
to "rightful' owner 
among new entrants to 
overcome diminishing 
performance 
 Corporate Venturing Innovators dilemma: 
Incumbents enter 
through acquisition to 
overcome diminishing 
performance of old 
business model 
Acquisitions increase 
market share and 
stabilize supply chain 
yielding performance 
gains 
Innovators dilemma: 
Incumbents exit 
cutting losses by 
divesting or liquidating 
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Covin and Miles (1999) proposed a useful typology to classify CE centered on the concept of firm level 
innovation with the objective of rejuvenating or purposely redefining organizations, markets or industries to create 
competitive advantage.  According to these authors, CE could be labeled as sustained regeneration, organizational 
rejuvenation, strategic renewal and domain redefinition.  Sustained regeneration is related to continuous improvement. 
Organizational rejuvenation focuses on the organizational changes necessary to improve firm processes.  Strategic renewal 
focuses on how the firm competes, and the necessary changes to adapt to new realities of competition and competitor 
moves.  Domain redefinition focuses on changes a firm needs to implement to enter into future new markets. 
 
Miles and Covin (2002) clarified the domain of corporate venturing and proposed that corporate venturing 
differentiates by focus of entrepreneurship and presence of investment intermediation.  According to these authors, 
corporate venturing could be internal or external to the corporation. In addition, it could be brought by direct investment in 
the venture through the corporations operating strategic budget or by indirect investment in the venture using financial 
intermediaries. 
 
This study builds on the above mentioned typologies of CE (Covin & Miles, 1999; Miles & Covin, 2002) and on 
the call for re-examination of firm performance during disruptive technologies (Danneels, 2004).  Figure 1 (See Figure 1 
below) shows this study’s proposed typology of CE and firm performance during technological disruptions.  The model 
shows that firm performance is affected by the innovator’s dilemma during entry and exit.  An incumbent often overshoots 
by emphasizing on CE of “sustained regeneration” rather than switch to CE of “domain redefinition” or to corporate 
venturing.  However, Christensen (1997) claims that companies that have become leaders through the practice of CE of 
“sustained regeneration” cannot enact a CE of “domain redefinition.”  This notion is challenged by Danneels (2004), who 
calls for renewed empirical theorizing and testing on this matter.  
 
The ultimate answer to whether firms can use (or learn to use) new CE forms is empirical.  Covin and Miles 
(1999) suggest that there is no causal relationship between one CE form and another. These authors state that “while 
sustained regeneration and domain redefinition, for example, may be outcomes of similar entrepreneurial processes, firms 
that regularly introduce new products or enter new markets (evidence of sustained regeneration) may never have an arena-
creating new product-market introduction (evidence of domain redefinition), and firms that achieve the latter may not be 
frequent new product-market innovator” (Covin and Miles, 1999: p.55).  Nevertheless, it is not clear whether firms could 
effectively learn different CE processes.  Disruptive technologies provide the definitive ground for an empirical test of CE 
effectiveness.  During technological disruptions, incumbents incapable of domain redefinition are rendered obsolete 
resulting in declining firm performance and the ultimate destruction of their investment in old technologies.  Hence, other 
things being equal -- such as business segment, location of main operations, and timing of entry -- incumbents that 
implement CE of sustained regeneration/organizational rejuvenation during growth will have superior firm performance, 
and those that implement CE of domain redefinition will survive technological disruption.  If there are learning across-CE 
forms then the former leads to the latter. Three hypotheses emerge out of the preceding discussion. 
  
Hypothesis 1: CE of sustained regeneration / organizational rejuvenation will yield superior performance during growth. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Best performers during growth have a chance of surviving technological disruption by implementing CE of 
domain redefinition.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Other CE forms different from domain redefinition – e.g., that focuses on internal entrepreneurship --- will 
lead to overshooting, diminishing performance, and ultimately the collapse of the firm. 
 
The computer industry has been widely studied for its sequential waves of rapidly changing disruptive 
technologies (Christensen, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  Figure 2 (See Figure 2 below) shows a 
stylized description of the sequence of disruptive technologies in the computer industry.  The growth period between 1986 
and 1995 is ideal to test CE effectiveness. First, it is necessary to avoid the period of turbulence that followed immediately 
after the occurrence of a disruptive innovation. The effect of the entrepreneur dominates the period of turbulence 
(Christensen, 1997), which obscures the other components of CE.  
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The introduction of the personal computer in 1976 by Apple Inc. initiated the personal computer technological 
disruption. After a period of turbulence from 1976 to 1985, large public companies took a dominant position in the 
computer industry (Bergin, 2006).  The period between 1985 and 1995 witnessed the rapid growth of the global computer 
hardware industry main competitors.  The year 1995 was marked by the explosive growth of the Internet (Bergin, 2006; 
Newsweek, 1995).  After 1996, most companies either initiated an aggressive turnaround or pressed forward on mergers 
and acquisitions or divestments. The shake out period of 1997 to 2000 was exacerbated by the technology-bubble-bust 
starting in March 2000 and lasting well into 2003 (Gregory, 2003). Technology companies were further shattered by ripple 
effects of corporate scandals (Times, 2006).  Thus, the ideal period in the computer industry to study growth due to CE is 
between 1985 and 1995.  This period excludes the turbulence added by entrance of new entrepreneurs to the personal 
computer technology (1976-1984) and to the internet technology (1996-2000) and technology corporate scandals (2000-
2006).  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Firm Performance Gains and Technological Disruptions in the Computer industry 
 
 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Data 
 
Research Insight was the main data reference.  Company names obtained from Research Insight were cross-
referenced with a variety of sources, including Marketguide, Hoovers, Bloomberg, and SEC filings.  Ten years of data for 
each firm were computed to estimate a pooled cross-sectional time-series research design.  Using techniques for analyzing 
missing data (Little & Rubin, 1983), this study estimated R&D missing data points for five firms resulting in a final sample 
of 330 firm-years of data.  This study employs producer price indices for each segment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
to adjust each firm’s variables to 1990 dollars. This adjustment enables cross-firm and cross-time comparisons.  
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 68
Review of Business Information Systems – Third Quarter 2007 Volume 11, Number 3 
This study uses the method of structured content analysis to collect data to evaluate entry, growth, and exit 
strategies (Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980). This method has been applied before to analyses of the auto and airline 
industries (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Lieberman, Lau, Williams, & Williams, 1990).  A three-pronged approach was used 
to classify the strategies.  First, a variety of sources were reviewed including company reports, firm proxy statements, 
electronic SEC filings, Bloomberg merger and acquisitions reports and database, and press releases.  Second, the main 
author of this study categorized the information for each firm according to previously determined theory-driven categories.  
A research assistant performed similar tasks independently.  Third, we compared the two sets of categories. The conflicting 
differences were resolved by mutually cross-referencing our categories with information from Overview and History 
Hoovers’ profiles.  This method guarantees inter-rater reliability.  
 
Sample 
 
The sample comprises thirty-three firms from the computer hardware industry from 1986 to 1995.  These firms 
compete in the U.S. personal computer, super computer, mini computer, and special computer segments of the industry.  
The computer industry exemplified the quintessential technological and competitive environment that makes this a high-
velocity industry in which corporate entrepreneurship is critical (Bourgeois III & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995).  The computer hardware industry is entrepreneurial per excellence, providing the ideal ground to test our model.  
The composition of the sample was personal computers 15%, super computers 21%, mini computers 30%, special 
computers 15% and conglomerates 18%.  The sample was divided in two geographic regions, “West” and “Rest.”  Two 
sets of companies were not included in this analysis. The first group started before 1984 but was out of business before 
1995 (61 firms). These firms did not survive the personal computer technological disruption. The second group of firms 
started much later than 1984 and still had operations in 1995 (15 firms).  These firms were in a much earlier stage of 
growth than those started before 1984.  The remaining sample of 33 firms was active between 1984 and 1995.  Hence, the 
sample comprises firms that faced both the first technological disruption (personal computers) and the second one 
(internet). 
 
Variables 
 
The dependent variable is “performance gains,” which is the logarithm of yearly percent changes of operating 
income per employee. Operating income is computed as sales at the end of the year minus the total costs-of-goods-sold, 
and this value divided by the number of employees. These values were adjusted using price deflators for each business 
segment with base US$1990 (Lieberman & Asaba, 1997; Lieberman & Demeester, 1999; Lieberman, Demeester, & Rivas, 
2002). 
 
The independent variables are “firm-fixed-effects,” “past performance,” “physical capital per employee gains,” 
“R&D per employee gains,” and “cycle time reduction.”  Fixed-effects are dummy variables for each firm (Greene, 1993; 
Judge, 1985).  The firm fixed-effects in a dynamic model are performance gains due to unique characteristics of the firm.  
“Past Performance” is the natural logarithm of the value of two-year lagged operating income per employee.  These values 
were adjusted using US$ 1990 price deflators for each business segment.  “Cycle time reduction” is the natural logarithm 
of the percent rate of change between current value of “Cycle Time” and one-year lagged value. “Cycle Time” is measured 
in weeks of work-in-process-inventory.  These values were adjusted using US$ 1990 price deflators for each business 
segment (Lieberman & Demeester, 1999; Lieberman, Demeester, & Rivas, 2002).  Second, “R&D per employee gains” is 
the natural logarithm of the percent rate of change between current values of “R&D per employee” and one-year lagged 
value.  “R&D per employee” is measured as the stock of R&D per employee.  The stock of R&D is calculated using the 
perpetual inventory method discounting the assets by 10% (Hulten & Wykoff, 1996). The resulting values were adjusted to 
US$ 1990 using the GDP deflator. 
 
 “PP&E per employee gains” is the natural logarithm of the percent rate of change between current values 
of “PP&E per employee” and one-year lagged value.  “PP&E per employee” is the end of the year net property-plant-
and-equipment per employee. These values were adjusted using US$ 1990 price deflators for each business segment. 
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There are several categorical classification variables in this study.  “Acquisitions per year” is a dummy 
variable to measure acquisitions during growth.  Firms were classified according to their mode of entry: 1) “Internal 
Venture,” if entry is by developing a product in-house; 2) “Buy,” if entry is by fully acquiring another existing firm; 
3) “Alliance,” if entry is established by strategic alliance or by investment in partial ownership of another existing 
firm.  Dummy variables were used to classify firms according to their business segment, “Super Computers,” “Mini 
computers,” “Personal Computers,” “Special Purpose Computers.”  These categories follow the practices of 
Eisenhardt (1990), Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995).  There is also included a dummy variable for Conglomerate 
Growth, indicative of diversified firms.  The exit strategies were 1) “Liquidate,” if firms filed for bankruptcy and sold 
assets to pay debts; 2) “Divest,” if firms sold computer business-units to different firms and ceased to be active in the 
computer industry; 3) “Sell,” if firm was fully acquired by another firm; 4) “Domain redefinition,” if firms divested 
some assets but reinvested proceeds into new business-units that were related to the disruptive technology.  Figure 3 
(See Figure 3 below) shows the classification of CE forms used by computer firms during the personal computer and 
the internet technology disruptions.  
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Corporate Entrepreneurship Forms Used by Computer Firms during Two Technological Disruptions 
 
Focus of 
Entrepreneurship 
CE domain CE forms Entry  Growth Exit 
Sustained Regeneration  Investment in 
physical capital, 
investment in R&D. 
Past performance 
 
Organizational 
rejuvenation 
 Cycle Time 
reduction 
 
Strategic Renewal     
Corporate 
Rejuvenation  
Domain Redefinition   Domain redefinition
Direct-Internal Internal venture   
Internal 
Corporate 
Venturing Indirect-Internal    
Sustained regeneration    
Organizational 
rejuvenation 
Strategic 
alliances 
  
Strategic Renewal    
Corporate 
Rejuvenation  
Domain Redefinition    
Direct-External Entry through 
acquisition, 
Entry through 
strategic alliance
Growth through 
Acquisitions 
Sell (Sell company 
to another company), 
Divest  
(sell divisions to 
different companies)
External 
Corporate 
Venturing 
Indirect-External   Liquidate 
(intermediary 
financial institutions 
assisting bankruptcy)
 
 
The study includes control variables namely “Entry before Disruption I,” and location “West” and “Rest.” “Entry 
before Disruption I” is a dummy variable for firms that went public before 1976 --Apple Computer Inc. had IPO in 1976.  
The Location dummy variables classified the geographic region of main operations within the U.S.: namely “West” and 
“Rest.”  The dummy variable “West” indicates location of main operating activities in one of the western states of the U.S. 
namely California, Washington, and Oregon, and includes Japanese companies. “Rest” measures location of main 
operations in any of the continental states except the western states.  Regression coefficient for regional CE effects were 
obtained by multiplying location dummy variables by the CE variables (Judge, 1985).  
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Estimation Techniques 
 
This study employed dynamic modeling with pooled cross-section and time-series data (Greene, 1993; Hsiao, 
1986). Models were estimated with ordinary least squares OLS because the dependent variable is continuous. Regression 
models were estimated with an overall intercept and one less dummy variable than the total number of firms. In doing so, 
the dummy variable not considered in the new set of dummies becomes a benchmark.  The intercept represents the 
individual firm-effect of the benchmark company.  Each dummy variable is an estimate of the difference between each 
company and the benchmark company.  Regression parameters’ standard errors were corrected by using the White-
consistent variance-covariance estimates to adjust significance levels (White, 1980).   Multicollinearity was tested by using 
the coefficient of Tolerance.  The test of First and Second Moment Specification was used to test for generalized 
heteroscedasticity, and the Durbin-Watson test checked for autocorrelation.  No instrumental variables were used to 
estimate the lagged variable “Past Performance.”  This would entail a discussion of the effect of inertia in past performance, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 (See Table 1 below) shows the regression parameters for performance gains during Growth II (1985-
1995).  The model corresponding to parameters for all firms (Nation) shows that the firm fixed-effects were significant 
across the board (p<0.001) along with “Past performance” (p<0.001), “Cycle Time reduction” (p<0.01) and “PP&E per 
employee gains” (p<0.05).  There were non-significant parameters namely “Acquisitions,” “Entry before Disruption I,” and 
“R&D per employee gains.”  The model corresponding to parameters for “West” versus “Rest” firms (Regional) shows that 
“Cycle Time reduction” is significant for “West” firms (p<0.001) and not for the “Rest” firms.  Conversely, “PP&E per 
employee gains” is significant for the “Rest” firms (p<0.05) and not for the “West” firms.  The F-test shows that both 
models are significant (p<0.001), although with a low R-square (0.17-0.18). 
 
Table 1 
 
Performance Gains due to Corporate Entrepreneurship during Growth II 
 
Variable Nation s.e.  Regional s.e.  
Fixed –Effects 0.51 (0.12) *** 0.51 (0.12) *** 
Past Performance -0.08 (0.02) *** -0.09 (0.02) *** 
Acquisitions 0.001 (0.04)   0.01 (0.04)   
Entry Before Disruption I -0.03 (0.03)   -0.03 (0.03)   
Cycle Time reduction: NATION 0.11 (0.04) **     
R&D per employee gains: NATION 0.13 (0.08)      
PP&E per employee gains: NATION 0.17 (0.09) *     
Cycle Time reduction: WEST     0.14 (0.05) *** 
Cycle Time reduction: REST     0.08 (0.05)  
R&D per employee gains: WEST     0.24 (0.18)  
R&D per employee gains: REST     0.08 (0.10)   
PP&E per employee gains: WEST     0.13 (0.14)   
PP&E per employee gains: REST     0.17 (0.10) * 
R square 0.17    0.18    
F 6.77   *** 5.47   *** 
Notes: Pooled cross-sections (33 firms) time-series (10 years) N = 330. Standard Errors are in parentheses. One-tailed tests for 
hypothesized effects and two-tailed otherwise. 
  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2 (See Table 2 below) shows performance gains during growth (firm fixed-effect) tabulated by 
corresponding CE strategy.  The values are calculated for national, regional, entry, and exit strategies.  The table reports T-
student tests (one-tail unequal variance) between firms that chose CE of “Domain Redefinition” when facing Disruptive 
technology II (internet) and all other firms according to their strategies.  Firms that choose “Domain Redefinition” had 
significant higher performance gains during growth than all other firms. 
 
Table 2 
 
Firm Performance during Growth and Corporate Entrepreneurship Strategies 
 
 All Regions Entry Strategies Exit Strategies 
   West Rest Inter Vent Buy 
Allianc
e Sell Divest Liquid. 
Dom.  
Redef. 
# of Firms 33 16 17 30 2 1 16 1 2 14 
Performance 
Gains during 
Growth 
55% 55% 54% 54% 59% 66% 51% 50% 51% 59% * 
  * p < .05 
Notes: This table reports fixed-effects parameter estimates obtained from cross-section time-series regression of CE strategies 
on firm performance gains using pooled data with N=330 (33 firms, 10 years 1986-1995). These values represent the average 
percentage gains of firm performance during 1986-1995 tabulated for each category. Values are calculated for region, entry 
and exit strategies. In addition, it reports T-student tests (one-tail and unequal variance) between “Domain Redefinition” 
(Dom. Redef.) and all other strategies.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study proposed a model of corporate entrepreneurship (CE) and firm performance under technological 
disruption.  It started with the goal of testing what types of CE would yield superior performance on entry, growth 
and exit during two consecutive technological disruptions of the computer industry namely the personal computer and 
internet disruptions.   
 
The results largely support the hypotheses that CE rejuvenation yield superior performance during growth. 
Firms that invested on physical capital and reduction of cycle time (evidence of sustained regeneration and organizational 
rejuvenation) significantly improved firm performance during growth. As expected, past performance (evidence of inertia) 
dampened CE effectiveness.  The lack of significance of investments of R&D on performance is disappointing, though not 
unexpected.  Investment in R&D is a weak measure of human capital, which ultimately should be associated with effective 
CE.  
 
In addition, the results support the hypothesis that best performers during growth will have a chance of surviving 
technological disruption by implementing CE of domain redefinition.  Firms that implemented domain redefinition to 
overcome technological disruption in 1996 (internet) had superior performance during the growth period 1986-1995.  
Hence, this evidence suggests that firms that successfully implement a form of corporate rejuvenation during growth 
(sustained regeneration/ organizational rejuvenation) will have a better chance to implement another corporate rejuvenation 
strategy, such as domain redefinition, during a disruptive technology.  These findings suggest that learning of one CE form 
could facilitate the learning of another CE form.  Given the limited sample of this study, further research is needed to test 
this proposition. 
 
The findings also suggest that location is a moderator of the relationship CE–performance.  Two different 
regions (West and Rest) show different CE profiles.  The “West” had a higher prominence than the “Rest” in 
organizational rejuvenation through reduction in “Cycle Time.”  On the other hand, “Rest” firms had higher 
prominence than the “West” in accumulation of physical assets.  These findings suggest the existence of two regional 
resource-based-strategies namely “innovation” (by the “West” firms) and “creative imitation” (by the “Rest” firms) 
(Drucker, 1985).  Historical accounts (Bergin, 2006) suggest that firms in the “West” employed a strategy of 
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innovation, creating a technological disruption.  “West” firms were pioneers and implemented CE faster than the 
firms in the “Rest” by continually improving organizational processes that ultimately created manufacturing 
efficiency.  However, firms in the rest of the US (“Rest”) used a strategy of creative imitation to catch up.  They were 
able to match the firms in the “West” by investing rapidly in physical assets, by imitating organizational processes, 
and by creatively replicating and adapting technological knowledge.  More research is needed to assess the extent of 
location as moderator of CE. 
 
Limitations And Suggestions For Future Research 
 
Several unanswered questions from this study create opportunities for further research including issues 
concerning CE learning and location as moderator of the relationship CE-performance. A replication of these findings is 
needed on other industries that are as entrepreneurial as the computer industry.   
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